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This chapter considers the notions of political space and 
representation, and their connections, in the light of recent 
theoretical debates and direct political interventions. It highlights 
the accounts of political space and representation offered by 
Ernesto Laclau on the one hand, and Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri on the other. Through a consideration of UK Uncut and 
Occupy, it argues that while both accounts capture elements of 
contemporary developments, the former is more convincing. 
 
 
The space of democratic politics: an outline 
This section outlines a necessarily schematic and brief historical 
overview of the space of politics vis-à-vis democracy. Its express 
purpose is to provide historical contextualisation of recent 
developments, and not to enter debates or engage with the extant 
literature in this field. 
In ancient Athens, democracy and space were clearly 
delineated: politics had its own topos, and that topos was the 
Assembly. Everywhere else was considered to be the site of non-
politics, and was populated by non-politicians – slaves, women, 
non-natives, minors. In the Assembly, politics occurred, and it 
proceeded dialogically, polylogically. The Assembly was the site 
where democratic discussion and debate was conducted by the 
demos. The scope of politics in Athens was widespread, its 
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consideration and implementation of issues was unrestricted within 
its boundaries, and every issue was subordinated to the 
consideration, deliberation and decision of the demos. There were 
two spatial supplements to the Assembly: the democratic 
institutional structure – the Council, Committee, Courts, and so on 
– which accompanied the Assembly throughout the history of 
Athenian democracy;1 and an additional spatial extension that was 
temporal, the agora. This served as a supplementary discursive 
space in which issues were identified and discussed, and positions 
negotiated and planned.  
 In the modern period, representative democracy was 
instituted, starting with the American revolution in the late 
eighteenth century. These American revolutionaries did not favour 
democracy, and suggested an alternative to the dominant 
conception of political organization favoured by political philosophy. 
This proposed a threefold classification of monarchy, aristocracy 
and democracy. To this, these American revolutionaries added a 
fourth: representation.2 They differentiated representation from 
democracy because they were fully aware that politics proceeds 
differently under these two different forms of organization; they 
required different spaces in which politics could be conducted. 
                                                        
1 This institutional structure is well illustrated by Figure 1.1 in Held (2006: 18). 
2 This fourfold classification is made by, among others, Thomas Paine in chapter 3 
of The Rights of Man, and James Madison in number 10 of The Federalist Papers. 
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 Representation – now widely known as representative 
democracy – sought to expand the space of politics, before quickly 
enclosing it. It seized power from the ‘absolute’ monarch on behalf 
of the people, and enclosed it within parliament – a term derived 
from the French parler, to speak, and has come to be associated 
with the place of (political) discussion (by representatives) – and its 
related institutions. It sought to take care of politics, to unburden 
politics from the demos. In order to differentiate representative 
democracy from other forms of representation – such as absolutism 
– there was a temporal incursion into this enclosure of political 
space by representatives, when every four or five years the 
represented chose and elected their representatives. This temporal 
incursion raises the questions of how and where the represented 
were to exercise their choice. The liberal utopia of the expanding 
and benevolent private sphere conceived and promoted the 
mediation of the electorate via the media into this private sphere. 
This was done first through newspapers, and then through 
broadcast media forms such as newsreels, radio and television. 
 This liberal utopian account of political space came under 
challenge throughout the nineteenth century and well into the 
twentieth. Political parties solidified as the key mechanisms of 
representation and, with the extension of the franchise and the rise 
of collectivism and labour, the phenomena of political meetings and 
related events steadily developed, expanding the space and 
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opportunity for political debate to be aired and engaged with. This 
process was halted and turned into reverse during the last third of 
the twentieth century, as a result of technological developments 
within the broadcast media, and the increasing ascendancy of 
neoliberalism which rejected any intrusion of the public sphere, 
while trumping notions of individualism and the sanctity of the 
private sphere. 
 Marx and much subsequent Marxist theory and practice also 
rejected this account, by identifying class conflict as the motor of 
history. This conflict occurred at the point of production – at the 
economic level – and all other levels, including politics, were 
determined by this according to the base-superstructure model. The 
accounts of both Laclau and Negri originated in the Marxist 
tradition, which they have subsequently adapted and developed. It 
is to these two theorists’ consideration of political space, 
representation and their combination that we now turn. 
 
 
Laclau, political spaces and representations 
The concept of representation has been a prominent feature of 
Laclau’s thought, whereas that of political space has not received 
extensive consideration. This section maintains that there is, 
however, an overlap between these two concepts, and I will argue 
in the final section that Laclau’s theorisation of them illuminates 
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recent political practice. This section begins by focusing on the 
unexamined notion of political space in Laclau. 
 Laclau’s vocabulary is littered with spatial metaphors and 
related terminology. These include ‘neutral terrain’, ‘new political 
frontiers’, ‘territory’, ‘anchorage’, ‘fault’, ‘fissure’, ‘horizon’, ‘ground’, 
‘topography of the social’, ‘field of discursivity’, among others. 
These terms are not deployed to refer to discrete objects in an 
empirical manner, but are conceptual tools used to embellish 
Laclau’s theoretical analysis of politics. 
 This analysis is premised upon a critique of both Marxist and 
liberal accounts of space. Laclau’s theoretical trajectory to post-
Marxism involves an extensive and increasing critique of, and 
distancing from, Marxism and, in particular, its theorisation of 
essentialist notions of class, which positioned economic categories 
in a precise location in space to which politics was subordinated. 
Liberalism viewed space through the prism of the public-private 
distinction in a zero-sum manner, and sought to protect and expand 
the latter at the expense of the former. Laclau’s critique of 
liberalism’s political spatial theorisation is outlined in his 
consideration of, and comparison with, the approach of Richard 
Rorty (Laclau 1996b). For Rorty and other liberals, the public is 
conceived of as a singular space, and the boundary between the 
public and private is rigid. Laclau’s understanding of democratic 
societies – and their democratisation – challenges both these 
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premises: ‘the condition for a democratic society is that these public 
spaces have to be plural: a democratic society is, of course, 
incompatible with the existence of only one public space. What we 
should have is a multiple ‘civic republicanism’.’ (Laclau 1996b: 120) 
This amounts to both a pluralisation and a complexification of 
political space, but one that should not be understood as the 
inauguration of an undifferentiated or smooth space.3 Rather, this 
points to what Laclau refers to as ‘the unevenness of the social’. 
This allows for the continuation of what liberals regard as public 
space, but this is supplemented by alternative – and perhaps even 
competing – sites: ‘the liberal institutions – parliament, elections, 
divisions of power – are maintained, but these are one public space, 
not the public space.’ (Laclau 1996b: 120) 
 It is not merely that the public/private distinction is 
undermined and blurred, but that this spatial multiplication also 
severs and complexifies the divide between society and politics. 
With the modern age and the inauguration of the democratic 
revolution, politics is no longer located within a separate and 
distinct sphere within society, but begins to invest the entirety of 
the social:                                                         
3 The notion of smooth space was initiated by Deleuze and Guattari, and will be 
considered in the ensuing section on Hardt and Negri. It is not merely that the 
social is differentially structured by the increasing encroachment of the political 
for Laclau, but also that not everything within the social is political. This is due to 
residual factors and sedimented practices that predate the democratic revolution: 
‘[n]ot everything in society is political, because we have many sedimented social 
forms which has blurred the traces of their original political institution.’ (Laclau 
2005: 153) 
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the overdetermination of effects linked to the democratic revolution 
begins to displace the line of demarcation between the public and the 
private and to politicize social relations … Thus what has been 
exploded is the idea and the reality itself of a unique space of 
constitution of the political. What we are witnessing is … a proliferation 
of radically new and different political spaces. (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001: 181) 
 
This theorisation, in turn, entails a shift in political strategy, best 
described by the distinction Laclau forges between ‘capturing the 
state’ (as advocated by Lenin) and ‘becoming-State’ (as advocated 
by Gramsci). Laclau favours the latter over the former: 
 
The multiplication of political spaces and the preventing of the 
concentration of power in one point are, then, preconditions of every 
truly democratic transformation of society … This requires the 
autonomization of the spheres of struggle and the multiplication of 
political spaces, which is incompatible with the concentration of power 
and knowledge that classic Jacobinism and its different socialist 
variants imply. (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 178) 
 
 This plurality, pluralisation and complexification of political 
space is linked to the poststructuralist notions of the constitutive 
outside (originally conceived by Derrida) and dislocation. The 
former problematises any conceptualisation that considers spaces to 
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be discrete, readily identifiable and self-contained entities: 
‘[h]eterogeneity inhabits the very heart of a homogeneous space … 
The opaqueness of an irretrievable ‘outside’ will always tarnish the 
very categories that define the ‘inside’.’ (Laclau 2005: 152) Laclau 
is referring to the structure itself in this comment, but it follows that 
different political spaces continually adapt to ‘tarnish’ those outside 
through articulatory processes. Put another way, such spaces are 
never purely self-contained – they are never a pure particularity – 
but, rather, attempt to establish relations with other political spaces 
and directly engage in the social through articulation; the choice is 
not to remain silent, but to intervene directly in political debates.  
 Laclau uses dislocation to theorize a decentred structure 
constituted by antagonistic forces:  
 
That is what is meant by a decentred structure: not just the absence 
of a centre but the practice of decentring through antagonism … 
centres can exist only because the structure is decentred … in as far 
as the structure is dislocated, the possibility of centres emerges: the 
response to the dislocation of the structure will be its recomposition 
around particular nodal points of articulation by the various 
antagonistic forces. (Laclau 1990 40) 
 
This dislocation and decentring leading to the diffusion of the centre 
into centres results in the extension and/or intensification of 
politics: the multiplication of these centres signifies the expansion 
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of sites on which politics occurs, leading to a society that is more 
political.  
 This decentring and expansion of political space is, in turn for 
Laclau, akin to the temporalization of space. This does not amount 
to the eradication of space but, rather, its complexification and the 
impossibility of its mediation. Laclau conceives pre-modern peasant 
communities as ‘simple’ spaces shorn of the intrusion of 
temporality, and governed by cyclicality and repetition. ‘The 
representation of time as a cyclical succession, common in peasant 
communities, is in this sense a reduction of time to space.’ (Laclau 
1990: 42) In contrast, space in dislocated modern societies is 
infected by politics, that is, time: ‘dislocation is the very form of 
temporality.’ (Laclau 1990: 41) Such a consideration of time and 
space is in line with Laclau’s account of contingency and necessity: 
these are not to be considered as mutually exclusive, as the latter 
categories operate within the former in dislocated structures. We 
can thus speak of contingency within necessity, and time within 
space. ‘There is a temporalization of spaces or a widening of the 
field of the possible, but this takes place in a determinate situation.’ 
(Laclau 1990: 43) 
 Laclau also considers this ‘pure spatiality’ to be one from 
which myth is entirely absent: 
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A society from which myth was radically excluded would be either an 
entirely ‘spatial’ and ‘objective’ society – where any dislocation had 
been banished … – or one in which dislocations lacked any space for 
representation and transcendence. In other words, either cemetery or 
the lunatic asylum. (Laclau 1990: 67) 
 
It is this intrusion of myth into space that constitutes the 
politicization of that ‘pure space’, as ‘[p]olitics only exists insofar as 
the spatial eludes us.’ (Laclau 1990: 68) As a result of the scientific 
revolution and the development of positivism, myth was 
increasingly conceived to have been eliminated from the modern 
world. Laclau challenges this view, and his critical – though by no 
means unsympathetic – account of modernity involves the 
reinsertion of myth into the contemporary world. 
 The disruption of space through politics is achieved by this 
insertion of myth into the field of objectivity, or through the 
antagonistic attempt to represent that space. Representation, as a 
consequence, becomes unavoidable and integral to politics: 
 
The constitutive role of representation in the formation of the will, 
which was partly concealed in more stable societies, now becomes 
fully visible … This means that we cannot escape the framework of 
representative processes, and that democratic alternatives must be 
constructed that multiply the points from and around which 
representation operates rather than attempt to limit its scope and 
area of operation. (Laclau 1996a: 99) 
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Laclau, then, conceives representation in a positive light – in stark 
contrast to Hardt and Negri, as we will see in the next section – and 
it is to a consideration of Laclau’s account of representation that 
attention now turns. 
 Initially in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and 
Mouffe distance themselves from the notion of representation in 
favour of that of articulation. They conceive of representation as the 
representation of interests, in which there is a ‘transparent’ 
relationship between the representative and those they represent, 
whereby the former accurately identifies and promotes the interests 
of the latter. This presupposes that the represented possess fully-
fledged and fixed identities that the representative can accurately 
reflect in relevant fora. Such ‘transparent’ relationships are no 
longer valid, for Laclau and Mouffe, in those modern and 
contemporary societies characterised by dislocation and hegemony. 
Instead, such relationships are affected by the process of 
articulation, which transforms the field and contributes towards the 
construction of the identities of always-incomplete subjects. This 
conceptualization, ‘replaces the principle of representation with that 
of articulation. Unity between these agents is then not the 
expression of a common underlying essence but the result of 
political construction and struggle.’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 65) 
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 Following on from his collaboration with Mouffe, Laclau 
recuperates the concept of representation, and rephrases his earlier 
account as one that is not between representation and articulation 
but, rather, one that is between mediation and articulation. 
Mediation here refers to a correspondence between the full 
identities of the represented and representative, much the same as 
realism portrays a direct correspondence between a word and a 
thing. Representation in Laclau’s analysis becomes an expanding 
feature of hegemonic societies, and is aligned with the represented-
representative relationship. Laclau’s solo work is consistent in 
portraying representation as the ‘fictio iuris’ that someone is 
present and stands in for someone else who is absent (Laclau 1990 
38-9, 1996 97-8). According to the terminology just considered, 
this is always an articulation (which, for Laclau, is synonymous with 
representation), not a mediation (which, for Laclau, is synonymous 
with presentation). ‘If the representative and the represented 
constitute the same and single will, the ‘re-‘ of representation 
disappears since the same will is present in two different places.’ 
(Laclau 1990: 38-9) 
 He identifies two dual features of this process. In the first 
place, there is a spatial disparity between the place in which the 
represented-representative relation is cemented (an electoral 
campaign, for example), and the place in which the representative 
negotiates policy decisions with other representatives (a 
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parliament). These two different places are not only structurally and 
procedurally different but also comprise different techniques and 
tactics in order to persuade other members (Laclau 1996: 98, 2000: 
212). The second duality refers to the two-way process between the 
represented and the representative. In contrast to Habermas, who 
conceives of a one-way movement whereby the represented 
transmits their will which dialogically converges on the 
representative, Laclau insists there is a double movement in will 
formation between represented and representative. (The fascistic 
conception, on the other hand, is of a one-way movement in the 
opposite direction, whereby the representative constitutes and 
transmits the will of those he represents.) Thus, Laclau writes: 
 
The function of the representative is not simply to transmit the will of 
those he represents, but to give credibility to that will in a milieu 
different from the one in which it was originally constituted … It is in 
the nature of representation that the representative is not merely a 
passive agent, but has to add something to the interest he represents. 
This addition, in turn, is reflected in the identity of those represented 
… Thus, representation is a two-way process. (Laclau 2005: 158) 
 
 A society devoid of the process of representation, for Laclau, 
is one that is fully emancipated. Such a society is also characterised 
by the eclipse of power relations and, as such, Laclau draws a direct 
connection between power and representation. Power and 
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representation, then, are signs of not only a society that is partially 
emancipated, but of one that lacks a foundational act that could 
usher in a fully emancipated society. In rejecting full emancipation, 
Laclau delineates his project from those modern accounts that 
attempted to inaugurate such a fully emancipated society. Power 
and representation increase in importance due to ‘the unevenness 
of the social’ in contemporary complex societies. This follows 
directly on from the fragmentation of the social, which prompts the 
need to construct collective identities. The intensification of politics 
in such societies corresponds to an increasing role for 
representation. When speaking of the represented and 
representative, Laclau writes, ‘the gap between the two terms of 
this duality will necessarily increase in present-day societies and 
that the role of the ‘representatives’ will be ever more central and 
constitutive.’ (Laclau 1996: 100) This quotation comes from a book 
entitled Emancipation(s). Laclau presents this in the plural form to 
announce the impossibility of a fully emancipated society, that is, 
emancipation, but the continuing efficacy of partial emancipations. 
He does not regard this as a cause for despair but, rather, one that 
must be met by a pluralising strategy seeking emancipations, as 
opposed to emancipation. 
In a similar manner, the alternative to this failure of emancipation is 
not representation but, rather, representations.  
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 Thus, we can speak of representations in the plural, rather 
than representation in the singular. This necessarily entails the 
spatial expansion of the process of representation, and also 
indicates that representations will always be partial ones. ‘What 
about representability?’, Laclau asks. ‘It is clear that if there is no 
rational ground of the social, total representability is impossible. But 
in that case, we could speak of ‘partial’ representations.’ (Laclau 
1996a: 103) This expansion of representations challenges the 
ongoing growth of the political party, which witnessed an impressive 
rise during the earlier years of modernity and representative 
democracy. The era of the political party’s growth was one based on 
distinct parties transparently mediating the interests of the 
mediated. The eclipse of mediation and rise of representations does 
not spell the death knell of the political party, however, but rather 
their supplementation by alternative political forms (Laclau 1990: 
230-1). When Laclau formulated this in the last decades of the 
twentieth century, ‘new social movements’ provided this 
supplementation, but the final section argues that recent political 
developments – such as Occupy and UK Uncut – serve this 
supplementary function in the contemporary political scene. 
 A brief comment must be stated regarding the central thrust 
of Laclau’s theory, and regarding the consideration of 
representations and partial representations. The new situation 
means that strategically, these can never remain as partialities, 
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because to do so would condemn them to irrelevance. It would not 
so much render them incommunicable, as to extract them from the 
sphere of articulation. Instead, these partial representations should 
seek to coalesce with others into an equivalential chain. The 
elaboration of concepts such as ‘chain of equivalence’ (Laclau 2005: 
73-88, 129-132; Laclau and Mouffe: 127-134) – along with related 
ones such as ‘empty signifiers’ (Laclau 1996a: 36-46) – is the core 
concern of Laclau’s intervention in, and contribution to, political 
theory. In the formation of such an equivalential chain, the chain 
itself constitutes the construction of something new, and the chain 
itself becomes the representative of its partial representations. We 
can thus refer to the relationship between the equivalential chain 
and its partial representations as ‘the representation of 
representations’. It is the role of this ‘representation of 
representations’ that constitutes the primary point of difference 
between Laclau on the one hand, and Hardt and Negri on the other. 
The following quotation outlines this divide: 
 
The constitution of a ‘people’ requires an internal complexity which is 
given by the plurality of the demands that form the equivalential 
chain. This is the dimension of radical heterogeneity, because nothing 
in those demands, individually considered, announces a ‘manifest 
destiny’ by which they should tend to coalesce into any kind of unity – 
nothing in them anticipates that they should constitute a chain. That is 
what makes the homogenizing moment of the empty signifier 
 17 
necessary. Without this moment, there would be no equivalential 
chain, so the homogenizing function of the empty signifier constitutes 
the chain and, at the same time, represents it … The conclusion is 
clear: any popular identity has an inner structure which is essentially 
representative. (Laclau 2005: 162-3) 
 
The allusion to ‘manifest destiny’ in this quotation is an implicit 
reference to the account proposed by Hardt and Negri, which seeks 
to resist any return to a politics based around those ‘homogenizing 
moments’ provided by an equivalential chain. It is to a 
consideration of their account of politics that we now focus on. 
 
 
Undifferentiated space and non-representational politics 
Antonio Negri’s work devotes more attention to temporality than 
spatiality (Negri 1999, 2003). One of his most stimulating 
suggestions in this regard is his alignment of the French 
Revolutionary period with time, and the American Revolution with 
space, in his most important solo book, Insurgencies: Constituent 
Power and the Modern State. Yet, despite this primary focus on 
temporality, a theorisation of political space is an integral aspect of 
Negri’s account of contemporary politics and philosophy. 
 The core development occurred in the early 1970s with the 
shift from operaismo to autonomia. Accompanying this shift were 
two transformations in Negri’s theorization that has continued to 
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imbricate his account, one at the level of social analysis, the other 
with reference to political organization. In terms of social analysis, 
operaismo was committed to a ‘collaborative research project’ that 
aimed to analyse the ‘class composition’ of the working class. Negri 
and operaismo regarded post-war Italian society to have become 
simplified, bifurcated into the two core classes of capitalism. The 
operaismo investigation into the proletariat’s class composition 
constituted a consideration as the working class as a pure and 
distinct entity, shorn of any relationship with either capital or 
‘representative’ institutions, such as political parties 
(predominantly, the PCI) and trade unions. Negri provided his 
analysis of the workers’ class composition in an important and 
influential essay entitled Keynes and the capitalist theory of the 
state post-1929 (1968). In this, Negri differentiates between the 
professional worker and the mass worker. The former is identified 
to the period between the middle of the nineteenth century and the 
twin crises of capitalism of the early twentieth century, caused by 
the Russian Revolution and the Wall Street Crash. The engineer was 
the exemplar of the professional worker, and this component 
exercised leadership over the remainder of the working class in the 
factory, akin to the vanguard element provided by the Leninist 
party. Negri regards that these twin crises force capitalism to 
reorganize in order to avert the threat posed by the sway of the 
professional worker. Their response was Fordism, Taylorism and 
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Keynesianism, which ushered in the era of the mass worker, a 
relatively undifferentiated composition, characterised by semi-
skilled as opposed to specialised labour, and its mass activity both 
in the realms of production and consumption. The spatial focus of 
Negri’s analysis, therefore, converges on the industrial zones, which 
were expanding both in number and scale. This concentration 
identifies the large-scale factory as the core space of politics, to 
which other levels (such as parliament) were subordinated. 
 Soon after writing this essay, Negri regards that the 
upheavals of 1968 and the subsequent stagflation provoked by the 
oil crises leads to the decomposition of the mass worker, and its 
replacement by the social or socialized worker.4 This shift is aligned 
with a spatial transformation with fundamental consequences for 
social analysis. The topos of both the professional worker and the 
mass worker had been confined to the four walls of the factory. The 
topos of the social worker, by contrast, explodes these boundaries, 
and invests the entire realm of society. With this shift, the crucial 
factors of production, exploitation and conflict are no longer 
restricted to the realm of the factory, and their relocation expands 
considerably as they spread throughout society. With this 
broadening of locus, attention shifts from an exclusive focus on the                                                         
4 Negri theorises the breakdown of Keynesianism – and its key figure, the mass 
worker – in two articles entitled Reformism and restructuration: terrorism of the 
state-as-factory command (Negri 1974a), and Theses on the crisis: the working 
class multinational (Negri 1974b). In these articles, Negri refers to the mass 
worker’s successor as the multinational worker, but subsequently amended this 
to the social or socialized worker. This replacement first occurs in Archaeology 
and project: the mass worker and the social worker (Negri 1982).  
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worker in the factory – the industrial labour-force – to a wider gaze 
throughout society, involving other subordinated and marginalised 
groups including women, students, migrants (especially those 
emigrating from the south to the north of Italy) and the 
unemployed. In other words, while the mass worker features 
exclusively in the realm of production, the social worker cuts across 
the divide between production and reproduction. Negri’s 
identification of the social worker is informed by a distinction Marx 
forged between formal subsumption and real subsumption in the 
Grundrisse (1993). The latter signifies the moment when the formal 
subsumption of capital is surpassed, and the entirety of society is 
subsumed under the rule and logic of capital.  
 With these transformations, then, there is a shift from a 
clearly delineated locus of political space in the factory, to one that 
enlarges throughout the entire realm of the social, such that the 
space of politics becomes undifferentiated. The social worker is the 
precursor to, and bears many of the features of, the multitude, the 
political subject of Negri’s collaborative project with Michael Hardt. 
Their collaboration conceives spatiality in a similarly undifferentiated 
manner, and in Empire, they deploy three concepts associated with 
Gilles Deleuze to illustrate this absence of differentiation: the 
society of control, smooth space and deterritorialization. The society 
of control is contrasted with and succeeds Foucault’s disciplinary 
society. Disciplinarity is associated with the array of institutions 
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(prisons, asylums, hospitals, barracks, and so on) that Foucault 
investigated, which all share with the factory the notion of 
enclosure. Similar to Negri’s earlier theorisation of the shift from the 
factory to society, in the society of control these walls break down, 
not in order to eliminate discipline but, rather, to disseminate 
control throughout society (Hardt and Negri 2000: 329-330). The 
Deleuzian notion of smooth space was controversially adopted by 
Hardt and Negri in Empire to express the disintegration of the 
defunct theoretical distinction between first, second and third 
worlds, and to support their characterisation of empire as decentred 
and deterritorialized. ‘The space of imperial sovereignty … is smooth 
… In this smooth space of Empire, there is no place of power – it is 
both everywhere and nowhere. Empire is an ou-topia, or really a 
non-place.’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 190)5 While presenting empire 
as a deterritorialized space, devoid of an outside, they specifically 
align the notion of deterritorialization with communication: 
 
sovereignty seems to be subordinated to communication – or actually, 
sovereignty is articulated through communications systems … The 
deterritorializing capacities of communication are unique:                                                         
5 There is also a sub-section entitled A smooth world, where Hardt and Negri 
expand on this (Hardt and Negri 2000: 332-60).  This concept received much 
critical attention in the commentaries on Empire, prompting Hardt and Negri to 
distance themselves from it in Commonwealth: ‘Recognizing that imperialism is 
over and a new imperial world is materializing does not in any way imply the end 
or even a lessening of division and hierarchy between and within societies. The 
claim by some proponents of capitalist globalization that the world is becoming 
“flat”, that the global economy is becoming one smooth space … is pure 
ideological mystification’ (Hardt and Negri 2009: 228). 
 22 
communication … attacks the very possibility of linking an order to a 
space. It imposes a continuous and complex circulation of signs. 
Deterritorialization is the primary force and circulation the form 
through which social communication manifests itself … The space of 
communication is completely deterritorialized. (Hardt and Negri 2000: 
346-7) 
 
This deterritorialization of space through communication bears 
similarities with Laclau’s account of incomplete subjects temporarily 
supplemented by articulatory practices, but such logics of 
difference, are theorized alongside logics of equivalence producing 
the equivalential chain in Laclau. This provides a more convincing 
account of the role of communication and its effects on political 
space than the notion of undifferentiated – or smooth – space 
theorised by Hardt and Negri. 
 In Commonwealth, they clarify this spatial undifferentiation, 
albeit in a minor way. As opposed to their earlier claim that politics 
was diffused throughout the entire realm of the social, Hardt and 
Negri now locate the site of the common to the metropolis. ‘The 
metropolis is the site of biopolitical production because it is the 
space of the common, of people living together, sharing resources, 
communicating, exchanging goods and ideas.’ (Hardt and Negri 
2009: 250) They regard there to be two key qualities that define 
the metropolis, firstly this immersion in the common, and secondly, 
‘the unpredictable, aleatory encounter or, rather, the encounter 
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with alterity.’ (Hardt and Negri 2009: 252) These two qualities are 
somewhat schematic and under-theorised, especially as they are 
clearly referring to the biopolitical activity of the multitude as 
opposed to a compelling account of the political spaces through 
which the multitude’s nemesis, empire, operates. It is certainly the 
case that Hardt and Negri formulated a rich account of the layers 
and level of imperial sovereignty in Empire, but this becomes 
difficult to integrate with other aspects of their theory, most 
notably, that of smooth space and deterritorialization. This lack of 
clarity is reinforced by their eventual rejection of the notion of 
smooth space, without indicating how this rejection affects other 
concepts (such as the contrast between the ‘horizontal’ struggles of 
modernity and the ‘vertical’ struggles of postmodernity). Might 
Hardt and Negris’ rejection of smooth space leave a topos 
characterized by ‘the unevenness of the social’, as theorized by 
Laclau? 
 The second theoretical transformation Negri developed with 
the move from operaismo to autonomia in the 1970s occurred in 
political organization. The PCI was the most successful communist 
party in post-war Western Europe. This success, alongside its 
strategy of pursuing class alliances through its allegiance to 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, created a gap on the left of the 
political spectrum which operaismo and autonomia occupied. 
Operaismo’s response was to replicate the traditional hierarchical 
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party structures associated with communist and socialist parties. 
Structurally, Leninist principles such as vanguard, discipline and 
organization suffused the party form of operaismo. Such Leninist 
organizational principles were abandoned with the emergence of 
autonomia. One of autonomia’s aims was to abolish any remaining 
hierarchies within the working class, and they adopted a horizontal 
organizational – as opposed to a vertical or hierarchical – form in 
order to achieve this. Autonomia, then, was effectively a political 
party characterised by a ‘non-party’ form, an ‘organization’ without 
hierarchies aiming to dissolve hierarchies in the working class, in 
which means become ends. Rather than having representatives, 
mediating forces or even delegating responsibility, Negri thought 
the working class should seize control of its own internal 
organization: ‘there can be no working class conception of the party 
unless it is a working class desire for reappropriation of 
organization.’ (Negri 1974c: 61) With this, the national focus and 
hierarchical party structure of operaismo turns in favour of local 
initiative and the autonomous (non)organization of autonomia. The 
intention is for the latter to entirely replace the former. The space 
of politics, as a consequence, ceases to be clearly delineable, and 
becomes more diffused throughout the realm of the social. This is a 
logic that points towards a smooth space. 
Hardt and Negris’ account of representation is related to this 
move away from hierarchical party structures. They consistently 
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cast representation in a negative light and seek to develop a politics 
for the multitude shorn of any representational features. They 
express the ‘two modernities’ through a variety of dichotomies: 
sovereignty versus democracy; transcendence versus immanence; 
the people versus the multitude; Hobbes versus Spinoza; and, the 
projects of Hobbes, Hegel and Rousseau versus those of 
Machiavelli, Spinoza and Marx. In this explication of the two 
modernities, representation is one of the key weapons of 
sovereignty. For Hardt and Negri, Hobbes provides the foundation 
for modern accounts of sovereignty, and Hobbes conceives that 
sovereignty displays two key features: transcendence and 
representation (Hardt and Negri 2000: 84). Irrespective of whether 
the notion of representation is dressed up in democratic clothing – 
as is the case with Rousseau’s general will – it ultimately 
establishes a transcendental schema, whereby the members of the 
political community are entirely subordinated to the One that 
secures their representation – or, in Rousseau’s terminology, 
whereby the will of all is abandoned in favour of the general will. 
‘Rousseau’s notion of direct representation is distorted and 
ultimately overwhelmed by the representation of the totality that is 
necessarily linked to it – and this is perfectly compatible with the 
Hobbesian notion of representation.’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 85)  
Hardt and Negri regard that the two themes of this chapter – 
political space and representation – are brought together by 
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Hobbes. They explicitly align Hobbes’s project of sovereignty with 
spatiality: ‘Hobbes establishes the spatial metaphor of sovereignty 
for all modern political thought in his unitary Leviathan that rises 
above and overarches society and the multitude. The sovereign is 
the surplus of power that serves to resolve or defer the crisis of 
modernity.’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 325) In other words, 
sovereignty constitutes the delineation of a territorial space, and 
simultaneously unifies a political space in the figure of a Leviathan 
which controls and orders that wider territory. That control operates 
through representation, whereby the decision(s) of the sovereign 
represents the will of the people.  
In Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, Hardt 
and Negri characterize representation as a ‘disjunctive synthesis’ 
(Hardt and Negri 2004: 241—4). It is a disjunctive synthesis 
because it simultaneously connects and separates. The connection 
would be the ‘moment’ of sovereignty initiated by the social 
contract or, in Hobbes’ terminology, the transformation of a 
multitude into a people. The separation occurs immediately after 
this foundational moment, and is ongoing thereafter. It comprises 
the separation of the sovereign from the people such that he can 
direct the latter, and the establishment of a hierarchical polity. 
Hardt and Negri state, ‘we can recognize the essence of 
representation: it connects the citizens to government and at the 
same time separates them from it. The new science is based on this 
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disjunctive synthesis.’ (Hardt and Negri 2004: 244) Representation, 
thus, in Hardt and Negri is inevitably an overarching strategy that 
enables sovereignty to achieve transcendence. There are never 
representations in the plural according to Hardt and Negri; the 
concept of representation is necessarily associated with that of the 
transcendent One.  
While this account of representation is readily 
comprehensible, it throws up difficulties when it is applied to 
contemporary political developments. Specifically, it becomes 
difficult to appreciate what a politics devoid of representation – a 
non- or anti-representational form of politics – would constitute. For 
Laclau, this attempt to disassociate representation – and, hence, 
power – from politics would constitute its eclipse. Hardt and Negri 
argue that a strategy celebrating withdrawal, exodus and flight 
constitute this alternative to representation. But this fails to address 
how these would be articulated or, put another way, how a strategy 
of withdrawal would be expressed in a non-representational form 
within a context in which representation is a key political process. 
Laclau responds to Empire in an important article entitled Can 
immanence explain social struggles? (Laclau 2004). In this, he 
attacks Hardt and Negri for imagining that the multitude will 
coalesce spontaneously, and insists that any political transformation 
occurs though a political project characterized by articulation. 
Although they don’t directly acknowledge this, Hardt and Negri have 
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taken this criticism on board, as they have abandoned certain 
conceptual features associated with a politics of spontaneity. Most 
prominent here is what they termed ‘the incommunicability of 
struggles’ in Empire, in which the struggles of the multitude against 
empire could never coalesce because the local conditions – their 
singularity – were untranslatable (Hardt and Negri 2000: 52-9).6 
The thesis that struggles are incommunicable has been superseded 
by the delineation between the ‘always-already’ ontological 
multitude and the ‘not-yet’ political multitude (Hardt and Negri 
2004: 219-27) and the project to recognize, reappropriate and 
produce the common that was the pivotal goal of Commonwealth. 
They believe that the common can be articulated through the 
horizontal distributed network that pertains to the multitude. The 
recent rise and proliferation of social media certainly points in this 
direction, but in Declaration they also voice clear concerns with this 
form. They note that, ‘control over information and communication 
networks have created the mediatized’ and also recognize that 
horizontal decision-making is ‘often extraordinarily slow’. (Hardt and 
                                                        
6 The incommunicability thesis was grounded on the distinction between struggles 
in modernity and those in postmodernity. The former were ‘horizontal’ in that 
they sought to forge connections both between different organizations and over 
time in order to unite, and ultimately overpower, domination and exploitation. 
The latter, by contrast, erupted violently and leapt up to pose a singular and 
‘vertical’ challenge to empire: ‘what the struggles have lost in extension, duration 
and communicability they have gained in intensity.’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 54) 
In Commonwealth, there is no reference to postmodernity as an historical epoch 
that succeeds modernity. Instead, the contemporary period is still characterized 
as modernity, but one in which there are ‘two modernities’, the major line of 
modernity, and the minor line of alter-modernity (Hardt and Negri 2009: 67-
128). 
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Negri 2012). This follows on, in turn, from their account of empire 
as a networked form. Negri’s methodological approach has often 
been to isolate and identify tendencies and, with this issue, Hardt 
and Negris’ position can only be verified in time.  
For the moment, however, the application of a non-
representational form of politics remains problematic when what 
Hardt and Negri regard to be its instantiations are considered. It is 
towards such a consideration that we now turn. 
 
 
Occupy and UK Uncut 
This chapter began with a schematic historical overview of political 
space. While the dominant liberal conception of representative 
democracy conceives of the space of politics as enclosed within 
parliament and related institutions, a number of practical political 
interventions and theoretical interpretations have challenged this 
view. Laclau and Hardt and Negri are two prominent theorists, 
although there are a number of alternative accounts who challenge 
this liberal conception, most systematically, Pierre Rosanvallon 
(2008). In terms of practical political interventions, Laclau focused 
on the emergence of new social movements in the 1980s in his 
collaboration with Mouffe, whereas Hardt and Negri have pointed to 
the Zapatistas, the alterglobalization movement at the turn of the 
millennium, and those opposed to the war in Iraq. This section 
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concentrates on two political movements that have emerged in 
response to capitalism’s latest Great Depression and financial 
globalization, UK Uncut and Occupy. It considers their approaches 
to space, representation and their relationship with conventional 
party politics, while also focusing on their organizational structures, 
in order to cast light on the two theoretical approaches considered 
in this chapter. It argues that while both approaches capture recent 
developments, Laclau’s is more in tune with the structures, aims 
and methods of these movements. 
 UK Uncut emerged in response to the austerity programme – 
dominated by public service cuts – initiated by the incoming 
Coalition government in 2010.7 UK Uncut began as a Twitter 
hashtag, but quickly attracted media interest and support from the 
public, swelling its activity to fifty-five towns and cities across the 
UK. It highlights tax avoidance by multinational corporations, 
arguing that tackling this avoidance – both through new legislation 
and appropriate funding and enforcement of existing legislation – 
would obviate the necessity for the cuts. Although their array of 
activities have evolved and developed, primarily they target retail 
outlets of these corporations, often re-enacting scenes from hospital 
wards, libraries, nurseries, and so on to make a direct connection                                                         
7 To view UK Uncut’s structural organisation, past activities and events, and 
guides for future actions, see www.ukuncut.org.uk. All ensuing quotations dealing 
with UK Uncut are taken from this website. For a consideration of UK Uncut’s 
relevance, see Finlayson (2011), and Mason (2012: 54-7).  UK Uncut’s analysis 
has been influenced by the Tax Justice Network (www.taxjustice.net), whose 
positions can also be found in Murphy (2011) and Shaxson (2011). 
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between the company’s tax avoidance and the range of services 
being cut. Organizationally, most of their activity is channelled 
through their website and other social media forms, and their 
networked structure is loose and informal – ‘we do not have formal 
membership’ – with actions proposed, organized and enacted by an 
‘army of citizen volunteers’ throughout the country: ‘UK Uncut is 
your movement. If you have an idea for an action, or want one on 
your high street, it’s up to you to make it happen.’ Through a 
powerful and prolonged ‘grassroots’ campaign, UK Uncut seeks to 
pressurize government and opposition representatives to reverse 
their approach to tax collection and deficit reduction: 
 
We cannot wait until the next election. If we want to win the fight 
against these cuts (and we can win) then we must make it impossible 
to ignore our arguments and impossible to resist our demands. This 
means building a powerful grassroots mass movement, able to resist 
the Government cuts at every turn. 
 
 While this indicates a rejection of the slow rhythms of 
electoral-representative politics, it also suggests that UK Uncut do 
not conceive of themselves as an alternative to party politics and 
parliamentary representatives but, rather, as a supplement to 
them. They seek to influence and transform policies adopted by 
parties and representatives, but also to intervene and 
fundamentally shift public debate, by providing a framework 
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through which actions can be proposed, planned and enacted. Their 
website and use of social media serve to attract citizen volunteers 
to perform actions. The aim of these actions is to enter into the 
political debate. Those affected by this include the witnesses to such 
activity, and those exposed to the coverage these actions generate. 
This coverage, in turn, not only exposes UK Uncut’s agenda, but 
also serves as a recruiting ground for future actions. 
UK Uncut, as a consequence, is a complex organization which has 
both a representational and participatory function. Participation 
occurs through the various events and actions it organizes, whereas 
its relationship to representation is more complex and varied. On 
the one hand, UK Uncut seeks to offer an alternative representation 
– on the issue of tax avoidance and its effects on public service cuts 
– to affect the political debate and public opinion. In this sense, it 
serves as an example of the expansion of representation that Laclau 
theorises. On the other hand, it seeks to intervene directly in the 
traditional realm of representation, by seeking to transform the 
policies of representatives in parliament.  
UK Uncut serves as yet another example of the expansion of 
political space, and subverts the function of retail outlets, turning 
them from zones of shopping into sites of political action, 
intervention and spectacle. There are two further features we can 
associate with UK Uncut. In the first place, they have a clear goal 
with which they are associated. Next, they have achieved temporal 
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continuity, with further activities planned at the time of writing, 
thereby maintaining their organization and its profile for over two 
years.8 This endurance indicates that the organizational form and 
the activities it seeks to engender can prove to be a novel and 
persistent feature of political life, which can be replicated by other 
political movements. 
 Occupy and its slogan – ‘we are the 99%’ – speak directly to 
the two themes this chapter considers: political space and 
representation. In terms of political space, Occupy has a 
straightforward position: it seeks to expand it. In fact, its very 
name announces such an expansion. In this, it proved extremely 
successful, rapidly expanding over six continents and, according to 
a number of estimates, nearly a thousand cities. Occupy sought to 
(re)appropriate public space, primarily through encampments which 
aimed to practice and promote open, participatory democratic forms 
and debate. As one participant noted: 
 
We sought to create the most horizontal and democratic space 
possible, using the assembly as our primary tool … what is most 
important is to open space for conversations – for democracy – real, 
                                                        
8 This is no small achievement considering the establishment’s repeated attempts 
to intimidate them, most notably the mass arrest of 138 activists. Mason (2012:  
60) asks why police chose to arrest these peaceful activists while, at the same 
time, failing to tackle a group of black bloc protesters. Establishment hostility and 
crackdowns are a feature of both groups under consideration. The dedication to 
Occupy in Chomsky (2012: 7) is made to the 6,705 people that have been 
arrested for supporting Occupy. 
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direct and participatory democracy … We organize in decentralized but 
connected working groups. (Taylor et al 2011: 8) 
 
As this quotation demonstrates, the language, methods and aims of 
Occupy share clear affinities with the decentred, leaderless, 
networked approach that Hardt and Negri theorise with the 
multitude.  
 It is not only that the assemblies and various fora of Occupy 
seek to expand political space, but they also aim to provide an 
alternative spatial form of politics. The form of ‘real, direct and 
participatory democracy’ referred to in the quotation is posed in 
direct contrast to, and a clear challenge for, the traditional liberal 
account of political space provided by representative democracy. 
Occupy, however, are not thoroughgoing in their rejection of 
representation. A comparison can be drawn between the direct, 
participatory methods that are internal to Occupy, and its approach 
to the outside of this internality. The encampments and its 
participants claim to represent – to be the representative of – those 
that are external to them. Their widely adopted slogan of ‘we are 
the 99%’ not only neatly illustrates the effects of neoliberal 
financialization whereby a few gain at the expense of the many, but 
also makes the claim that the Occupy movement speaks for, and 
represents the interests of, the 99%. Such representation of the 
interests of the 99% was most manifest in the plethora of 
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communicational forms Occupy deployed to broadcast its presence 
and message. It proved extraordinarily adept at deploying a whole 
armoury of new social media to communicate with its intended 
audience.9 In reviewing two swiftly published collections on Occupy, 
Andrew Ross indicates: 
 
On the face of it, any book about Occupy might have been 
superfluous. After all, the movement has been so meticulously 
documented by its own participants through a variety of media-official 
websites, blogs, tweets, livestreaming and other social media 
channels, in addition to alternative radio and TV, and a steady flow of 
pamphlets, gazettes, journals and other print outlets. Never has a 
protest movement documented and broadcast its doings in real time 
with such utter transparency and to such a far-flung audience. In 
some respects, the sheer volume of self generated media has even 
pre-empted the need for conventional media coverage. (Ross 2012) 
 
 This sheer volume of output to ‘the represented’ contrasts 
starkly with the reluctance or refusal of Occupy to issue demands to 
traditional representatives in parliament. This strategy was adopted 
to avoid co-option by such representatives, and to symbolize and 
differentiate Occupy’s approach to politics from that of 
                                                        
9 Two recent accounts that consider the interaction between the proliferating 
forms of new social media and politics are Castells (2011) and Mason (2012). 
Hardt and Negris’ ‘empire trilogy’ deal with this theme, especially Commonwealth 
(2009). 
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representative democracy.10 The numerous Occupy encampments 
endured for no more than months and the combination of its 
existential intensity and novel impact make it difficult to fully 
appreciate or assess its political effects. Occupy were by no means 
pioneers in practicing durational occupation, and introducing new 
spaces of politics, and alternative modes of expression of opposition 
than rallies and demonstrations. Commencing in September 2011, 
Occupy followed on from a wave of occupations including by student 
groups in Chile, the UK and beyond in 2010, the indignados of 
Puerta del Sol and hundreds of other public squares in Spain, 
replicated in Syntagma Square and throughout Greece, that 
characterised the summer of 2011. These, in turn, followed on from 
the revolutionary scenes in early 2011 throughout north Africa and 
the Middle East, most prominently symbolized by Tahrir Square, a 
strategy which secured the overthrow of regimes in both Tunisia 
and Egypt, and protracted civil wars in Libya and Syria. This ‘Arab 
Spring’ was itself predated by similar tactics adopted in 
Independence Square during the 2004 Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine, and other colour revolutions throughout the region. What 
differentiates Occupy from these, however, is the global scale of its 
impact. The rapidity of this impact which was enabled and 
                                                        
10 The issuing of demands was discussed at various General Assemblies including 
Occupy Wall Street, where the proposal was rejected. Non-ratified demands have, 
however, been issued: see, for instance, http://www.99declaration.org. Judith 
Butler’s contribution is perhaps the best expression of Occupy’s refusal of 
demands, see Butler (2011: 193). 
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facilitated by new social media, in turn, sets Occupy apart from 
earlier struggles with effects on the world stage – such as the 
alterglobalization movements at the turn of the millennium, and the 
mass mobilizations against the Iraq war – which required greater 
coordination.  
 Jodi Dean has described UK Uncut and Occupy as ‘vanguard 
activists’, adding ‘[t]heir work is the work of parties: not the parties 
of electoral democracy, but the responsive and revolutionary parties 
of the previous century.’ (Dean 2012) Vanguardism is most often 
associated with Lenin, but these contemporary political forms differ 
in at least two ways: in their organizational form, the discipline and 
tight control of Lenin’s revolutionaries has been abandoned in 
favour of looser, decentralized structures enabled by new social 
media (as Negri recognized in the passage from operaismo to 
autonomia); in no way can their goal be described as capturing the 
state as is outlined in State and Revolution, but is one far closer to 
the ‘becoming-state’ (that Laclau associates with Gramsci). Their 
vanguardism, however, hails from their critique of, and refusal to 
accept, the logic of neoliberal financialization, their commitment and 
their experimentation. Whether the organizational forms, the 
practices, the communicational and representational methods of UK 
Uncut and Occupy prove to be a vanguard development remains to 
be verified. What their arrival clearly announces, however, is both 
the continuing expansion – perhaps even the verification of such 
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expansion – of the space of politics, and a more nuanced and 
complex approach to the notion of representation. 
 Such a nuanced and complex approach militates against both 
liberal approaches to representative democracy, and also Hardt and 
Negris’ critical, yet somewhat straightforward, account of 
representation. In their latest brief collaboration, Declaration 
(2012), they repeat their earlier portrayal of representation as a 
disjunctive synthesis that increasingly appears outdated. In 
response, they celebrate what they consider to be the anti-
representational methods deployed by the Occupy movement. Yet, 
in attempting to connect Occupy with concurrent struggles and 
revolutionary activities, they concede: ‘[t]he struggles of 2011 … 
took place in sites far apart, and their protagonists have very 
different forms of life. Some overthrew tyrants and demanded the 
right to vote in free and fair election, whereas others criticized and 
refused political systems of representation.’ (Hardt and Negri 2012). 
Despite Occupy’s adoption of direct and participatory democratic 
forms, their central slogan – ‘we are the 99%’ – constitutes a 
representative claim, which poses the problem of what a post- or 
non-representational form of politics would comprise. UK Uncut, by 
contrast, reject the representative-represented relationship 
associated with parliament as the sole form of politics, and act to 
supplement and limit, rather than overturn and replace, this 
parliamentary form. Laclau’s theoretical account of the expansion of 
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political space and the increasing role for, and plurality of, 
representations constitutes a more convincing portrayal of 
contemporary developments. This account also emphasises that 
these expanded political spaces, and their representative role, 
serves as an addendum to the traditional form of representation 
associated with liberal democracy. Laclau would add that, in order 
to enhance their efficacy, the partial representations offered by UK 
Uncut and Occupy need to enter into a chain of equivalence – or, a 
‘representation of representations’.  
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